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Protection, Prizes or Patrons?
Explaining the Origins and Maintenance
of Human Services Interest Groups
RICHARD HOEFER
University of Texas at Arlington
School of Social Work
Little work has been done to understand the origins of human service
interest groups or how they maintain themselves once founded. This paper
tests three models of interest group origins and maintenance: a pluralist
approach in which groups form and con tinue because they protect members'
interests; a rational actor model in which groups form and are maintained
because they offer members "prizes" that are more valuable than the costs
of joining; and a patronage model in which groups form and continue
because financial backers are willing to support them financially. Results
show support for the "protection" and "patrons" models for the 127
Washington D.C. based advocacy organizations surveyed.
A theme running through much of the social work policy
literature is that social workers lack knowledge and power in
the political process (see, for example, Albert, 1983; Dear and
Patti, 1981; Ezell, 1993; Mathews, 1982; Wolk, 1981). One reason
for this may be the over-emphasis placed on individual political
action compared to using interest groups to affect policy As
Jones, Ericson, Brown, Trotter and Lynch argue: "Experience has
demonstrated that individuals who form groups for political
action are usually more effective in achieving their goals than
are persons acting alone" (1993: p. 125).
Interest groups, when mentioned, are often seen with suspi-
cion. Jansson, for example, states "Powerful interest groups and
well-heeled contributors have exercised extraordinary influence
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over American elected officials, to the detriment of social reform"
(1997, p. 364). Such a belief in the negative power of interest
groups draws attention away from the fact that there are interest
groups that fight for social reform, too. Little research exists in the
social work literature, however, about these interest groups (with
the exception of Hoefer, in press, Hoefer, 1998, and Hoefer, 1995).
One area that is particularly ill-studied concerns the origins and
maintenance of human services interest groups.
Interest groups have been defined in many ways, but the clas-
sic definition in the political science literature is: "any group that,
on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims
upon other groups in the society for the establishment, main-
tenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied
by the shared attitudes." (Truman, 1951, p. 33). There are many
such organizations at various levels of government which try to
affect social policy. It has been estimated, for example, that there
were 22,663 interest groups active in Washington, DC in 1996, an
increase of 54 percent compared to 1980's 14,726 groups. Of these,
an estimated 1,885 were active in social welfare issues in 1996,
up 90 percent from the 994 groups existing in 1980 (Hrebenar,
1997, p. 15).
Thus, at the national level, the rate of growth in interest groups
active in social policy far surpassed the growth of interest groups
in general. Knowing that these organizations were founded re-
cently and continue to exist leaves us with many intriguing ques-
tions. This paper addresses two major questions for a sample of
interest groups active in social welfare issues: "How did these
groups get started?" and "How do they support themselves?"
The implications of this information for social work practice are
also addressed.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In order to understand the origins and maintenance of interest
groups we must look at two intertwined questions: "How do
interest groups originate?" and "How do interest groups maintain
their existence?" While these two questions at first seem to be eas-
ily separated, it quickly becomes clear that how a group is started
is very much related to whether and how it continues to exist.
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It should be emphasized that this study looks exclusively at
organized interest groups in Washington D.C. that try to influence
national policy and not the many other types of actors that exist
in American politics at all levels. Social movements, for example,
have an interesting and important place in the literature and in
politics. There are many theories and ideas about how they origi-
nate and maintain themselves. Nonetheless, they are outside the
scope of this study. Additionally, there are theories relating to the
roles that nonprofit organizations play, such as Weisbrod's private
sector failure theory, or Kramer's comparative work. Because this
study focuses on just one type of nonprofit organization, those
playing the advocacy role, these theories are also left untested.
There are three major theories that address the questions
raised in this paper and that are tested: Truman's (1951) and
Dahl's (1956) pluralist "disturbance" theory where societal
changes activate latent groups to try to achieve some important
purposes; Olson's "rational choice" theory where each potential
member requires a "prize" in order to be induced to join and
stay a member; and Walker's "patronage" theory where groups
form and stay in existence due to financial support from one or a
few large contributors. All of these theories have their critics but
the empirical basis for the criticism is not always well discussed,
particularly in the social work literature.
Disturbances, Protection and Pluralism
Truman (1951) believed that the process of creating orga-
nizations was spontaneous, once citizens felt a pressing need.
He proposed the "disturbance theory" of group origins, arguing
that groups form due to disturbances in technological and social
environments which led to the need for representation of new
categories and interests. Some groups thus form to protect new
interests and some form to protect themselves from the changes
desired by the new interests. While it may be difficult for some
people with a shared interest to organize, if the problems encoun-
tered are sufficiently great, and if society does not restrain the abil-
ity to organize, then organizations will emerge to represent these
interests. Truman's theory builds upon a pluralist interpretation
of American society in which every potential group has power
simply from the fact that it contains voting citizens. Decisionmak-
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ers take into account the wishes of groups in society, even latent
groups, in order to protect their hold on power. Truman's theory,
while influential, does not provide specifics regarding how the
interest groups actually form or maintain themselves.
Dahl (1956), a leading pluralist theorist, provides a plausible
extension to Truman's ideas regarding how groups are founded.
He argues that all citizens have some political capital, even if they
choose not to use it. Because of this, power is widely dispersed
and no one set of elites controls political decision-making. Dahl
(1956) believes that people can be divided into two categories:
those interested in politics (homo politicus) and those not (homo
civicus). Politically interested persons naturally take charge of
interest groups and political organizations, but they are always
constrained by the legions of homo civicus. If political decisions be-
came too out of touch with ordinary peoples' desires, homo civicus
shifts from apathy to anger, and a new set of leaders is chosen.
Thus, behind the spontaneity of organization seen by Truman
lays a class of political entrepreneurs who by temperament and
training lead the political system. They do so by laying out clear
purposes to protect the group's interests.
Rational Choices, the Collective Action Dilemma and Prizes
Truman's (1951) and Dahl's (1956) view of the world is
strongly challenged by Olson (1965). Adopting an economic per-
spective of the "rational, self interested person," Olson perceives
that there are only two reasons to join a group which is seek-
ing collective goods (benefits available to everyone, whether a
member of the group or not). First, joining such a group makes
sense if it is coerced (as is joining a union in some states) or if
the selective benefits (i.e., those available only to members) one
receives are of greater value than the costs of joining. The problem
of convincing potential members that the benefits are greater
than the costs is known as the collective action dilemma. It is a
problem that every organization devoted to achieving collective
goods must overcome to survive. According to this theory, it is
rational for potential members to refuse to join a group dedicated
to collective benefits because they will enjoy the positive results
without having to contribute to the process. They are "free riders".
Olson's answer to the collective action dilemma and the problem
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of free riders is that interest groups, in order to continue existing,
should offer material benefits available only to members, such
as publications, low-cost consumer items, discounts on desired
goods and services, and so on. These material benefits can be
thought of as "prizes" that members value more than the cost of
their membership dues. Otherwise groups must rely on coercion
to survive.
Patronage
Empirically-based work by Walker (1991) has had a profound
impact on current understanding of the origins and maintenance
of interest groups. He shows that the commonly noted explosion
in the numbers of interest groups which began in the 1960s is
largely because of patrons-persons, organizations or govern-
ment agencies that want a particular organization to exist so much
that they underwrite all or a large portion of its budget.
"The key to the origins and maintenance of interest groups lies
in the ability and willingness of the patrons of political action to
expand the representative system by sponsoring groups that speak
for newly emerging elements of society and promote new legislative
and social values" (Walker, 1983: 404).
The existence of patrons has a profound effect on how group
leaders view the task of attracting members. It means that mem-
bers are no longer as necessary. The collective action problem is
reduced or eliminated. The job of a group leader is simplified
because organizations do not need to attract members with in-
centives that are subjectively worth more than the cost of joining.
The result is that some interest "groups" are not groups at all
but are non-membership interest organizations. Having members
may be advantageous for political reasons, particularly if a group
adopts a strategy using grassroots lobbying but the existence of
a patron eliminates the need for members as a major source of
funding.
Walker also shows that a group's membership can usefully be
categorized by its occupational base. Members (whether institu-
tional or individual) may come primarily from the forprofit sector
or the nonprofit sector. In addition to these workplace related
types of groups, other groups may have members who come from
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any field or from no field at all. This type of group is known as a
citizen's group.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
After describing the methodology of the data collection, this
paper focuses on testing these theories' applicability regarding
human service interest groups' origins and maintenance.
In particular, we address the following research questions:
1. When and how have human services interest groups been
founded?
2. How do human services interest groups and organizations
maintain themselves, once started?
3. Which theory of group origins and maintenance appears to be
most accurate in the area of human services interest groups
and organizations?
METHODS
The data for this paper come from mailed surveys of interest
groups based in Washington D. C. Names for the sample were
culled from the Washington Information Directory of organizations
that were active in social policy. A stipulation for inclusion in
the study was that organizational activities must include trying
to influence the executive branch as well as Congress. Telephone
calls were made to each organization to verify the information
in the Directory and to ascertain the person who should most
appropriately receive the survey. In all, 317 organizations were
identified as meeting all criteria and were sent surveys.
A typical mail survey process was used in this research: an
initial mailing to all groups, a postcard "Thank you"/reminder
ten days later, and a second full mailing to all non-respondents
two weeks later (Fowler, 1988). The response rate of 40% (127
organizations) is acceptable but tempers the strength of the con-
clusions that we can draw.
These groups may not be fully representative of all human
service interest groups, for two reasons. First, many groups do
not attempt to lobby the executive branch, focusing entirely on
Congress. Second, these organizations may not be representative
of all actors trying to influence social welfare policy because
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they have a continuing existence, as demonstrated by being in
a reference book on interest groups and by having a separate
phone number. Ad-hoc coalitions and movements run out of a
leader's basement are thus not in the population from which the
survey respondents are drawn, even though they may have some
impact on social policy. Formerly solvent groups that have died
out are also not included in the sampling process.
Despite these concerns, the information presented here is a
strong first step in understanding the origins and maintenance of
groups active in social policy. The groups chosen are good ones
to learn from for two reasons. First, they are among the most po-
litically savvy because they recognize the importance of working
to alter administrative regulations and other executive branch
decisions, not just legislation. Second, they are also successful, in
some sense, because they are still in existence.
RESULTS
This section provides information that addresses the validity
of the theories described above. Results are presented regarding
when groups were founded; where start-up funds came from
when the organizations began; how groups maintain themselves
financially; and which incentives groups currently use to attract
members. We then address the question of which theory best
explains the results.
When were groups founded?
The organizations in this study of human service interest
groups' origins and maintenance range in age (in 1994) from 2
to 206 years old. The median age is 23.5 years.
Walker's occupationally-based typology is reflected in the
results. Of the 127 organizations which responded, 18 (14%) are
forprofit based; 44 (35%) are nonprofit based; 31 (24%) are citizen-
based, and 29 (23%) have no members. Another 5 (4%) have a
mixed membership but are excluded from further analysis due
to this type's small numbers. We use these types of groups as an
important variable in our analysis because the answers for our
questions sometimes differ depending on the type of group.
Figure I shows the cumulative number of responding organi-
zations that existed at any one time (due to lack of response to the
122 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Figure 1
Cumulative Number of Groups, by Type, 1788-1992
120
100
-Forprofit
-Nonprofit
- Citizen
80 -- No Members
" 6O
E
Z
40
20
0
Year
question regarding founding year in the surveys, this information
is available for only 114 of the organizations). Separate lines show
totals for each type of group as well as all groups. The general
trend is remarkably clear: there was a steady, if slow, increase
in numbers of groups from the beginnings of our country to
the 1960s. In 1961 and 1962, a sudden spurt of growth occurred,
followed by a few years of stabilization. But in 1968 another spurt
started, lasting for two decades before ending.
Different types of groups followed the same general pattern,
with only slight differences. Nonprofit and citizen groups, for
example, have very similar patterns to each other and the over-
all curve, with there being fewer citizen groups at any time.
Non-membership organizations, beginning from the lowest base,
started increasing rapidly in number in 1966. Their numbers did
not level off until 1989. Forprofit groups are the smallest number
of organizations in the study. Their growth spurt started a bit
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earlier than the nonprofits and citizens, in 1966, but ended earlier,
in 1983.
Where did start up funds come from?
Table 1 indicates the source of start-up funds for the groups.
There are five sources which either did or did not assist the group
in its initial stage: small contributions from many individuals;
private foundations; corporations and businesses; large contri-
butions from one or a few individuals; and government. The first
category indicates a broad membership drive enabled the organi-
zation to establish itself; the other four might indicate that one or
more patrons were involved. More than one response is possible.
The most common sources for start-up funds are private foun-
dations and small contributions from many individuals. Over half
of groups received money from one or both of these sources. One
third of the groups got assistance from corporations or businesses.
Large contributions from a few persons was a source for nearly
a third of the respondents, while just over one-fifth of all groups
were assisted by a government agency.
There are important differences, however, in how the different
types of groups began. Forprofit groups tend to have received
funds from corporations as well as private foundations. Non-
profit groups were likely to have received start-up money from
private foundations and small contributions from many individ-
uals. Three-fourths of citizen groups got small contributions from
many individuals; about half received funds from private foun-
dations and large contributions from one or a few individuals.
Over three-quarters of organizations without members received
funds from private foundations, and, to a much lesser extent,
small contributions from many individuals.
Thus, while there are several sources for funds to help start
a new organization, the type of membership has an important
effect on the most likely strategy. Organizations for members
from the forprofit world can often receive assistance from for-
profit corporations and businesses, presumably part of their fu-
ture membership. An organization of forprofit nursing homes,
for example, might be started by some of the larger nursing home
chains in order to give themselves a larger and more covert voice.
Private foundations, sometimes controlled by successful business
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Table 1
Sources of Start-up Funds by Type of Group
Percent of Groups Receiving Start-up Funds
From This Source
All No
Groups Forprofit Nonprofit Citizen Members
Source (n = 104) (n = 17) (n = 36) (n = 25) (n = 26)
Private Foundation 53 41 47 48 77
(p = .15)
Small Contributions 51 31 46 75 44
from Many Individuals
(p = .02)
Corporate/Business 33 47 29 39 24
(p = .38)
Large Contributions 28 25 21 48 17
from One or a Few
Individuals
(p = .05)
Government (p = .64) 22 12 19 20 28
Note: P value is from a chi-square test of differences between the types of groups
(forprofit, nonprofit, citizen and non-membership). Each row is a separate
question. Answers to the question were either "Yes, funds were received from
this source when the organization was founded", or "No, funds were not
received from this source when the organization was founded." Only "Yes"
answers are reflected in this table.
persons, are also often contributors to new interest groups for
members from the forprofit sector.
Nonprofit groups rely on private foundations, too, but also on
the small contributions of many individuals, presumably initial
membership dues. A large majority of citizen groups needed
support from many individuals to get off the ground, although
private foundations and individual patrons are also important
sources of early funds. For organizations with no members, pri-
vate foundations are very often used to provide money in the
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beginning. Even here, many such organizations used small con-
tributions from many people to start operating. This is surprising,
since the donors provide money without becoming a "member"
of the group.
In sum, small contributions from many individuals is a tactic
that is especially important to citizen groups, although nearly
one-half of nonprofits and no-member organizations also used it.
Private foundations were particularly important for no-member
organizations, and, to a lesser extent, nonprofit and citizen
groups. Corporations and businesses supported forprofit groups
most, although over one third of citizen groups also received
support from this source. Citizen groups also had strong support
from a few individuals who gave large amounts. Government
was prone to give start-up funds to no-member organizations.
How do groups maintain themselves financially?
There is less variation in how groups obtain their current
budget compared to the types of funding sources they had at
their founding. The most important source for most types of
groups is membership dues. One third of all groups' budgets
comes from membership dues, on average. This is highest for
forprofit groups (50%) and, as expected, of no importance for
non-membership groups (0%). Nonprofit and citizen groups each
obtain around one-third of their current budgets from this source
(39% for nonprofits and 33% for citizen groups). Foundation
grants are the most important single source of income for non-
member organizations (38%), followed by money from govern-
ment (23%). Foundations, government and corporations provide
fairly small amounts of ongoing assistance to forprofit, nonprofit
and citizen groups. A residual category consisting of things such
as investment income and sales provides about one-third of the
budget for each type of group.
One constant problem for group leaders is to keep resources
flowing into the organization. Respondents were asked how im-
portant four different potential ways of increasing income were
for their group (see Table 2). Three different strategies emerge
from the answers. For forprofit and citizen groups, the key strat-
egy is to increase the number of members. This implies that the
group makes a "profit" on each member: the marginal cost of
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providing services or benefits is less than the income derived
from membership dues.
The second strategy, employed as the dominant approach by
non-member groups, is to increase the number of grant applica-
tions. Some groups must be considering becoming membership
groups, however, as there were responses indicating this was a
possible way to increase funds for the organization. These three
types of groups put most of their eggs in one basket, in terms
of increasing their budgets. Only nonprofit groups adopt a third,
multi-option strategy, believing that increasing grant income and
increasing membership are both important.
Fortunately for the groups, many of them had recorded in-
creases in membership size compared to five years previously.
Almost three-fifths of forprofit and nonprofit groups (57% for
both types) had some increase in the size of their memberships.
Almost half of citizen groups (45%) did the same.
Table 2
Importance of Tactics to Increase Group Budgets by Type of Group
Mean Score of Importance
All No
Source of Increased Groups Forprofit Nonprofit Citizen Members
Budget (n = 112) (n = 17) (n = 38) (n = 29) (n = 28)
Increase Grant 3.96 2.76 4.16 3.52 4.86
Applications
Increase 3.84 5.41 3.95 4.07 2.50
Membership
Increase 3.34 3.19 3.51 3.34 3.18
Fundraising
Efforts
Increase 2.40 2.44 2.28 2.18 2.75
Administration
of Government
Programs
Note: Answers were on a scale ranging from 0 (not used) to 6 (most important).
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What incentives do groups use to attract members?
Because membership dues are so important for the groups'
survival (except for the non-membership organizations, which
rely more on foundation grants and government contracts), it is
vital to know which membership incentives each group offers if
we are to understand how groups continue to exist. This infor-
mation is available from Table 3. Ten different possible member-
ship incentives were presented to respondents who marked how
important each is to their group's members. While this is not a
direct measure of the importance of the incentives to members,
it is reasonable to assume that group leaders have a good idea of
the services that members request and use.
The most striking result shown in Table 3 is the level of
agreement across all types of groups regarding the importance
of each incentive. "Advocacy of Ideas" is considered the most
important incentive by all three types of membership groups; in
addition the incentives in the "top three" and the "bottom three"
are identical across the groups.
There are only two incentives that are ranked differently by
the different types of groups. The first is the purposive incentive
of "Being able to participate in public affairs" which is ranked
fourth by citizen groups and seventh and eighth for forprofit
and nonprofit groups, respectively. Citizen groups place a greater
emphasis on involving their members in the advocacy process
compared to forprofit and nonprofit groups. This implies that
citizen groups are more likely to use grassroots campaigns to
influence policy than are the occupationally-based groups active
in the forprofit and nonprofit worlds.
The other incentive with disparate rankings is "Contact with
professional peers and colleagues" which is ranked fifth by both
forprofit and nonprofit groups and eighth by citizen groups. This
is reasonable because citizen groups are not organized along
employment-related lines, unlike forprofit and nonprofit groups.
There is thus no way to guarantee contact with peers and col-
leagues when the membership is drawn from a variety of em-
ployment backgrounds.
Each incentive in Table 3 has been labeled according to the
type of incentive it is: The assignments were first made based
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Table 3
Inportance of Membership Incentives, by Type of Group
Mean Score and Rank
All
Membership Incentive Groups Forprofit Nonprofit Citizen
and Type of Incentive (n = 80) (n = 16) (n = 38) (n = 26)
Advocacy 5.55 5.69 5.58 5.42
(Purposive) (1) (1) (1) (1)
Represent Members' 5.17 5.53 5.32 4.72
Opinions (Purposive) (2) (2) (2) (3)
Publications 5.03 4.88 5.18 4.88
(Solidary) (3) (3) (3) (2)
Conferences/Meetings 4.64 4.56 4.95 4.23
(Solidary) (4) (4) (4) (5)
Training and Education 4.36 4.00 4.76 4.00
(Solidary) (5) (6) (6) (7)
Contact with Professional 4.29 4.31 4.82 3.50
Peers (Solidary) (6) (5) (5) (8)
Participate in Public Affairs 4.16 3.94 3.95 4.62
(Purposive) (7) (7) (8) (4)
Friendship 4.03 3.69 4.16 4.04
(Solidary) (8) (8) (7) (6)
Insurance 1.44 1.25 1.51 1.46
(Material) (9) (10) (9) (9)
Consumer Discounts 1.40 1.82 1.24 1.35
(Material) (10) (9) (10) (10)
Note: Answers were on a scale ranging from 0 (not used) to 6 (most important).
on our interpretation of the literature. A factor analysis was con-
ducted to test the categorization using both no rotation and vari-
max rotation options in SPSS. The results from both analyses
supported the theoretical assignments of the 10 incentives into
purposive, solidary and material categories. In general, it ap-
pears that purposive benefits are most important, solidary ben-
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efits are second-most important and material benefits are, by a
wide margin, least important. This conclusion is true across all
types of groups.
Which Theory Best Explains the Results? The theories discussed in
the literature review have different explanations regarding why
the number of interest groups might have grown and what the
pattern of membership benefits offered would be. Truman's dis-
turbance theory combined with Dahl's (1956) pluralist theory says
that something happened in society to motivate larger numbers
of homo politicus to organize formerly latent groups. Groups exist
to protect their interests. Implied in this theory is that group
incentives will be primarily purposive in nature as the goal of
becoming involved is to counter some threat.
We can test this in two ways. First, we compare the years that
groups were founded with social policy history to determine if
group formation seems to increase more in periods of disturbance.
Second, we examine the types of incentives offered to determine
why group members join. If Truman is correct, we will find
that purposive benefits are more important than are solidary or
material benefits. Because we do not have historical data on the
types of incentives offered by groups in their earlier years, we
cannot be sure what was offered then. We will instead use current
data on the importance of incentives as a substitute.
Olson maintains that the collective action dilemma should
keep groups from forming unless coercion was used to force peo-
ple to join or unless material benefits are provided to members.
Thus, one of these two strategies must have been used to lure
members. Because these groups are voluntary in nature, we can
immediately eliminate coercion as a means of having members
join the human service interest groups in this study. Examining
the incentives offered will determine if Olson is correct.
Walker argues that patrons emerged at this time in society to
underwrite the existence of the new groups. In order to test his
theory, we will look at the percentage of groups which had patrons
when they were started and compare this to the time period when
groups were forming at an accelerated rate.
Testing "Protection". There are three time periods of great change
for social policy in American history. The first is during the Great
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Depression, when the foundations of the American welfare state
were laid. The signature event was the passage of the Social
Security Act of 1935. The second is the time of the Great Society
programs, culminating in the creation of Medicare and Medicaid
in 1965. The third is the era of backlash and retreat from the
social welfare state, which began in the late 1960s. (For three
approaches to social welfare policy history, see Day, 1997, Jansson
1997, or Trattner, 1999.) It would be reasonable, based on Truman's
disturbance theory to see an increase in the number of human
service interest groups during all three time periods.
Of these three periods, one might predict that the era of back-
lash would provoke the most consternation. Groups of people
who have been accustomed to receiving government funding
(either as clients, or as employees of government or nonprofit
agencies administering services) might work harder to maintain
their status than would people fighting for a new program.
In fact, social policy historians believe that the late 1960s and
onward have been a time of extreme change and disturbance
in social policy. Day (1997) , for example, states "The election
of President Richard M. Nixon [in 1968] began the retreat into
conservatism" (p. 343). Jansson (1997) considers the time between
1968 and 1980 as "the paradoxical era," with three conservative
presidents, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, pre-
siding over "a major period of social reform" (p. 241). By 1980,
a considerably more conservative Republican president, Ronald
Reagan, was elected. Day (1997) believes that "The elections of
Ronald Reagan and George Bush were the emerging tip of a reac-
tionary iceberg" (p. 372). This meant drastic cuts in social spend-
ing and the government grants that were thought to keep many
advocacy organizations solvent (Peterson and Walker, 1991).
Examining Figure 1 shows evidence that groups were more
likely to form during the three time periods when social policy
was in especial turmoil. There is an apparent, although slight,
increase in the rate of group formation in the early 1930s, a
noticeable jump in growth during the early 1960s and a steep and
sustained growth in numbers from the late 1960s to the late 1980s.
This pattern supports Truman's disturbance theory. The evidence
on this point is admittedly more heuristic than definitive, as
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many alternative explanations might be offered. Nonetheless, it
is supportive of Truman's hypothesis.
Truman's model also predicts that purposive incentives will
be most important. As noted in Table 3, the incentives currently
considered most important for maintaining interest group mem-
bership are purposive. The data therefore support the disturbance
theory of interest group formation in two ways. First, the time
periods of increased interest group formation were during times
of considerable change in social programs. Second, the groups'
incentives are primarily purposive in nature, which is what we
would expect of groups battling to protect a set of programs or
values.
Testing "Prizes". The data from this research give little support
to Olson's theory. The valued types of incentives offered are not
material benefits and there is no evidence to support the belief
that members are coerced into joining. Members do not need
prizes to join an organization. Rather, they want to see values
advocated, opinions represented and the chance to interact with
others sharing their ideas and interests.
Testing "Patrons". If patrons are an important part of why groups
start and continue, we should see more groups with patron sup-
port during the time of increased group formation than before.
The data support this prediction. Patrons were more common for
groups started after 1968 than before. Slightly over half of groups
(56%) started prior to 1968 had a patron of some type (government
agency, private foundation, business, or had large contributions
from one or a few individuals). Over four-fifths (81%) of groups
begun in 1968 or later, however, had a patron (chi-square = 9.67,
p = .009).
Differences continue after a group is founded. As seen in
Table 4, on average, groups begun prior to 1968 receive 40% of
their current funding from membership dues, compared to 32%
of groups founded in 1968 or later. This is the largest source of
funding. More significantly, however, groups begun prior to 1968
receive only 27% of current funding from patrons (private foun-
dations, government agencies and corporations or businesses)
compared to 47% of current funding for groups begun in 1968 or
later. The bulk of this difference is due to private foundations giv-
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ing three times as much funding to the groups that began in 1968
or later compared to the groups that were founded earlier. This
pattern remains even after one deletes groups with no members.
The data support Walker's patronage theory strongly. Patrons
are a much more prevalent source of funds to originate and
maintain human services interest groups in the years since 1968
than before. The growth in the numbers of human services interest
group may be due primarily to the growth in the number of
patrons available and willing to provide funds to found and
maintain groups active in social welfare policy.
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
While Olson's theory is not supported by the results of this
study, two of the three theories examined are supported. It ap-
pears that protection and patrons are both important. Truman
was not specific as to how groups started; rather he focused on
when they would emerge. Dahl (1956) posited the existence of
a leadership class (homo politicus) that would (somehow) bring
together latent group members when the need for protection was
great. Walker provides a financial mechanism to simplify homo
politicus' task. Rather than choosing one theory to be the complete
answer we can provide one combining two earlier theories. Thus,
the answer to the question "Why do groups start?" is: Human
Table 4
Percentage of Current Funding by Source and Era of Founding
Founded Founded
Before in 1968
Source of Current Funds 1968 or Later P value
Membership dues 40% 32% .219
Foundation Grants 8% 25% .001
Government Agency 12% 13% .763
Corporations/Businesses 6% 9% .383
Other 33% 21% .039
Total 99% 100% N/A
Note: Totals do not round to 100% due to rounding error.
Note: P value is based on a two-tailed independent samples T-Test.
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services interest groups tend to start when there is a distinct need
to advocate for or to protect values or programs and when patrons
are there to provide financial resources.
Groups may, of course, begin at any time and with any source
of financing. It can be difficult, however, to get people to join
an organization when everything is going well. In such cases,
members of homo politicus may long for controversy to erupt. In
fact, controversy may be manufactured if it does not exist. Liberal
groups, in recent years, used the "threat" of former Speaker of the
House Newt Gingrich and a conservative Republican Congress
to scare people into joining. Conservative groups have profited in
a similar way from using the images of President and First Lady
Hillary Clinton to entice membership.
There are limitations to this study that should temper our re-
liance on the data gathered. First, the response rate was somewhat
lower than is ideal, so the sample may not be entirely representa-
tive. A second limitation is that the choice of subject. Washington-
based, national-focus interest groups that conduct both legislative
and executive branch lobbying is a limited set of organizations. It
does not include social movements, small or ad-hoc coalitions,
locally influential groups or other potential subjects of study
More importantly, interest groups that once existed but did not
exist at the time of the survey could not contacted. The ways that
they were founded and maintained (for at least some time) might
provide information that contradicts or amends the data from
still-existing groups.
Despite these limitations, we can draw several implications
from the data. These implications should be considered empir-
ically derived, but open to additional research to support or
contradict them.
Persons working to create an interest group or advocacy or-
ganization addressing one or more social problems should keep
the following statements in mind:
1. Demonstrate a need for the organization.
2. Find a financial backer who will underwrite the start-up costs
of the group. Potential sources for a patron include private
foundations, government agencies, businesses or corporations
and individuals willing to contribute a significant amount of
money.
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3. The type of person you are trying to mobilize (persons from
the forprofit or nonprofit worlds, or people from all walks of
life), may impact the type of patron you are able to secure.
4. If a financial patron is not available, groups can be started with
small contributions from many individuals. This will increase
the amount of effort for the organizer, however.
5. Potential members want to know that their ideas will be rep-
resented and that their values will be advocated for. Emphasis
should be on what the organization will be able to do in these
areas.
6. Potential members also want opportunities to interact with
others, if only through the written word. A successful group
organizer must thus have both an external focus on advocacy
and an internal focus on members' desires to be informed and
involved.
CONCLUSION
This paper sought to answer two questions regarding human
services interest groups: "How do interest groups originate?" and
"How do interest groups maintain their existence?" The answers
are related, in that groups originate when patrons are available
to group organizers in times of social or political disturbance.
Groups continue to exist by offering purposive and solidary bene-
fits to their membership although groups founded since 1968 also
rely heavily on patrons. Non-member organizations continue to
exist if they are able to maintain a relationship with a patron.
The answers to these two questions allow us to test existing
theories of group formation and maintenance. We have rejected
Olson's "prizes" model, in favor of a combination of Truman's
"protection" and Walker's "patron" models.
This information is important for several reasons. First, social
workers must remember that not all interest groups fight against
social work values and social welfare programs. A large number
are "on our side". Second, it is helpful to understand how groups
originated and how they maintain themselves. Without such an
understanding, the groups may not be there to protect the values
and programs that social workers believe in. Finally, understand-
ing the issues raised in this research helps social workers develop
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additional organizations and can lead to better practice in the area
of community organization. If it is true that people acting together
are more effective than persons working alone, it is a professional
duty to test current theories to determine which are correct and,
based on the results, to develop better ones.
Additional research should be undertaken to add to and clar-
ify the results from this study. Particularly important questions
to answer include:
What motivates patrons to provide funds?
How do patrons and potential interest group leaders connect?
Do non-member organizations commonly change to member-
ship groups?
Do membership groups commonly change to non-membership
organizations? If either shift occurs, why and how does it occur?
Once questions such as these are fully explored, social work-
ers will have an easier time in protecting their interests and the
interests of their clients against other groups and organizations
that have a very different agenda.
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